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Abstract
Many local public goods are allocated by federal governments using ﬁxed regional
shares: every region is entitled a ﬁxed share of the total budget for a particular type of
public good. This paper compares this ﬁxed regional sharing rule with two alternative
allocation rules: ﬁrst best and common pool allocation. We ﬁnd that the ﬁxed regional
sharing rule performs relatively well if the regional shares are reasonable. Legislative
bargaining theory is used to study the determination of the ﬁxed regional shares.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the allocation of public investments over regions in a federal state.
In particular we are interested in the role of the ﬁxed sharing rule. By ﬁxed sharing rule we
mean that each region in a federation gets a ﬁxed share of the total budget for a particular
public good. This allocation mechanism seems to be present in many federations. It is
commonly, but not explicitly, used in the EU to allocate investment money over member
countries. It is used in Belgium to allocate federal investment funds to railway projects and
as well as being used in many more countries. Economists often consider such an allocation
av e r yi n e ﬃcient and senseless allocation as there is no explicit optimization of resources over
regions. These considerations lead us to the three questions we address in this paper. First,
we analyze under what conditions the ﬁxed sharing rule allocation does not depart too far
from the ﬁrst-best and the uncoordinated common-pool allocation. Second, we discuss what
mechanism determines the precise ﬁxed sharing rule that is used in a federation. Third, we
illustrate the eﬀect of ﬁxed regional investment shares numerically for rail investments in
Belgium.
To provide an answer to the ﬁrst question, we employ a political economy model with the
regions as the main players and consider the investments as local public goods. We deﬁne
three diﬀerent allocation mechanisms for regional investments. The ﬁrst-best will serve as a
benchmark. The second allocation mechanism is the common-pool allocation, where every
region can decide on its own investment level and where all investments have to be ﬁnanced
by federal tax revenues. The third alternative is the allocation of the total investment budget
over the regions according to a ﬁxed sharing rule. We show that, in general, the ﬁxed sharing
rule performs better than the common pool allocation and approximates the ﬁrst best if ﬁxed
regional shares are reasonable.
We use two variants of a legislative bargaining model to study the determination of the
ﬁxed regional shares. In the ﬁrst variant the share of each region is equal to its equilibrium
expected share from the bargaining game. The main implication of the model is that, the
stronger the region in terms of proposal power, the bigger is its share in the federal budget.
2In the second variant considered in this work we introduce the possibility to deter cheating
on agreed shares by a temporary majority or an agenda setter. We show that, under rather
general conditions, reasonable ﬁxed shares can be supported as an equilibrium allocation.
We illustrate the results and the welfare eﬀects of the alternative regional allocations for
rail investments in Belgium. Currently rail investment expenditures in Belgium are decided
and paid by the federal government in agreement with the regions. It seems that no political
agreement is possible if the rail investment expenditures do not follow a historical sharing
rule of 60% for Flanders and 40% for the Walloon region. One of our main ﬁndings for this
e x a m p l ei st h a tt h eﬁxed 60/40 sharing rule for federal funds in Belgium does not necessarily
generate large eﬃciency losses.
1.1 Related Literature
One of the main concerns of public and political economists is the ineﬃciency of local public
goods provision by a central legislature. Starting with Tullock (1959) and Weingast et al.
(1981), economists have modelled ﬁscal policy in democratic regimes as a common pool
problem and address the question of ﬁscal ineﬃciency in the form of excessive spending.
The reason of this ineﬃciency is that the beneﬁts are concentrated in speciﬁc jurisdictions
while the costs are spread across all the jurisdictions.
More recent theoretical studies readdress this problem. For instance, Besley and Coate
(2003) incorporate cross-regional spillovers in the model to study which level of government,
central or local, should decide on the provision of the local public good.
The empirical issue of the common pool problem also has been tackled in a variety of
studies. Among others, Knight (2004) proves existence of the common pool incentives by
analyzing 1988 Congressional votes over transportation project funding. It is shown that the
probability to gain support for a project by a legislator is increasing in the local spending
and decreasing in contributions to the federal tax revenues. This result implies aggregate
overspending, especially in politically powerful localities, as well as large deadweight losses.
As an alternative to a common pool allocation, local public goods can be allocated in
proportion to some single numerical criterion, such as population. Thus, federal governments
3can entitle each region with a ﬁxed share of the total budget. The cost/surplus sharing
problem has been studied from an axiomatic perspective. A comprehensive survey of this
strand is provided in Moulin (2002). There are also studies, such as Young et al. (1982),
which compare diﬀerent methods on the basis of certain “fairness” principles. One of the
conclusions is that the simple proportional allocation according to a single numerical criterion
might be preferable on fairness grounds.
In order to explain the determinants of regional shares as an outcome of a political process,
we employ the theoretical legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with
am o d i ﬁcation: the recognition probabilities vary across the legislators. The most closely
related paper in this sense is that of Knight (2005). However, in his work there are only two
types of legislators with respect to the recognition probability: members vs. non-members
of a transportation committee. Another diﬀerence with his paper is that we consider not
only a standard inﬁnite version of Baron-Ferejohn model but also an alternative variant,
in which we introduce the possibility of punishment to deter deviations from the speciﬁed
sharing rule.
To the best of our knowledge none of the studies has neither addressed the question
of eﬃciency of ﬁxed sharing rule nor has considered such a rule as an alternative to the
ineﬃcient common pool allocation.
2 The Model and Assumptions
In this section we describe the setup and the main ingredients of the model. Following
Persson (1998) we consider a federal state with n ≥ 2 regions. Each region has a homogeneous
population. The federal government uses federal tax revenue to provide a local public good
in those regions.
The federal government uses a labor tax t to ﬁnance the provision of the public good gi
in region i =1 ..n.W ed e n o t eb yLi the total labor supply in region i and assume that it is
ﬁxed. The total pool of tax revenues is then equal to t
Pn
i=1 Li. Since labor supply is ﬁxed,
the labor tax does not cause any distortions in the labor market. We assume that the cost
4ci of providing one unit of public good diﬀers among the regions because of geographical
characteristics, for instance.














The preferences for each region i with respect to the local public good gi and private con-
sumption qi are represented by a quasi linear utility function:
ui = qi + Hi(gi),i =1 ..n.
In line with the standard assumptions the function Hi(gi) is an increasing and concave




i(gi) > 0 and H
00
i (gi) < 0, i =1 ..n.
We use the Persson’s approach as a starting point but assume speciﬁcb e n e ﬁt function
Hi f o re a c hr e g i o n ,b e c a u s ei ti sp o s s i b l et h a tt h el o c a lp u b l i cg o o di su s e dm o r ei n t e n s i v e l y
in some regions.
3C o m p a r i n g D i ﬀerent Allocation Rules
In this section we consider the properties of three alternative allocations. First, we consider
the ﬁrst-best situation where the federal government allocates the public good expenditures
to the regions in order to maximize overall federal welfare. Next, we discuss the common-pool
allocation. Finally, we analyze the results of the ﬁxed regional sharing rule.
53.1 The First-Best Benchmark
In the ﬁrst-best equilibrium and in a normative interpretation, a federal policy-maker max-
imizes a general social welfare function, subject to its budget constraint and having non-
distortionary and individualized taxes at its disposal. If we assume that income distribution
between the regions does not matter1, so that the social welfare function is the simple sum














s. t. constraint (1).




= ci,f o ri =1 ..n, (4)
where FB stands for the ﬁrst-best allocation.
This standard result states that the marginal beneﬁt from a unit of local public good
i n v e s t m e n t si se q u a lt oi t sm a r g i n a lc o s t .
Notice that the same result can be reached if we assume decentralized decisions: the
regional governments have to decide on their own public good provision and pay for it with
a local non-distortionary tax.
3.2 The Non-cooperative Common Pool Solution
In this subsection, we assume that each region proposes its preferred level of railway in-
vestments, knowing that it has to be paid out of federal taxes. All regions do this non-
cooperatively. Now each region i solves the following maximization problem (taking gi, j 6= i
1Alternatively, we could assume that the federal government has lump sum taxes and transfers and uses
a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. This would result in another allocation of the numeraire good




[(1 − t)Li + Hi(gi)] (5)
s. t. constraint (1).








,f o ri =1 ..n, (6)
where CP stands for the common pool allocation. The level preferred in the common pool
allocation is independent of the quantity selected by the other regions because there are no









i.e. now the marginal beneﬁt of a unit of the public good is lower than the marginal cost,
and therefore, the regions prefer an amount of public good that is larger than the ﬁrst-best
allocation. This implies the higher total expenditure for the public good and the higher tax
level.
The over-consumption leads to a welfare loss compared to the ﬁrst-best allocation.
3.3 The Fixed Sharing Rule Allocation
In this subsection we assume a ﬁxed sharing rule: all public good investments are paid out
of the federal budget according to the ﬁxed shares αi for each region i. We suppose that
each αi ∈ (0,1) and
Pn
i=1 αi =1 .
The regional shares are ﬁxed but the total volume of investments is still to be determined.
We analyze two extreme assumptions: either the unweighted sum of regional welfares is
maximized or there is one region that decides on the total budget, maximizing its own
welfare.
We ﬁrst assume that the federal government maximizes the unweighted sum of regional
welfares under a regional ﬁxed sharing constraint. It therefore decides on the total budget
7for local public good provision G, which is the sum of all the local public good expenditures,


















cigi = αiG for i =1 ..n.
Notice that the problem is very similar to the ﬁrst-best allocation problem (3). The
diﬀerence is that the federal government decides on the total amount of the public good (vs.
the individual public good levels) with the additional constraint on the distribution of this
amount across the regions according to the ﬁxed sharing rule.












ci for i =1 ..n.S Rr e f e r st ot h eﬁxed sharing rule allocation.
There are several conclusions we can draw from expression (9). First, notice that this












Since αi ∈ (0,1), some terms in the square brackets should be non-positive while the other
ones should be non-negative. Thus, for some regions
∂Hi(gSR
i )
∂gi ≤ ci and for the others the
opposite inequality holds. This means that there is, compared to the ﬁrst best, overprovision
in some regions and underprovision in other regions.
Second, there exists a distribution of regional shares which produces the ﬁrst best allo-
cation. We provide a graphical illustration of this result for the case of two regions. Assume
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Figure 1: Fixed sharing rule vs. ﬁrst-best.
On Figure 1 the solid curve and the solid line correspond to the federal social indiﬀerence
curve and to the federal budget constraint, respectively. The budget constraint line has
slope c1
c2. The dotted line has slope c1
c2
1−α
α and it represents the ﬁxed sharing rule constraint




By manipulating the slope of the dotted curve, it is possible to restore the ﬁrst-best



























We can conclude that the larger the diﬀerence (α − α∗), the further we are from the
9ﬁrst-best allocation. In section 4 we analyze how the ﬁxed regional shares are determined in
a legislative bargaining setting.
The solution generated by the maximization of the unweighted sum of utilities is the
most favorable setting to reach the ﬁrst best with a ﬁxed sharing rule. The other extreme
is that one region acts as a dictator and selects the total budget for the public good. This
region, denoted by k, will maximize its regional welfare under the ﬁxed sharing rule, giving














Let us assume that the share αk =
Lk
L , i.e. it is proportional to the population size. In
the region k the ﬁrst-best allocation is then restored.

















k for i 6= k. (12)
One can check that, in order to restore the ﬁrst-best allocation in the other regions, the








for i 6= k,
i.e. for two regions i 6= k and k the ratio of the regional shares should be the same as the
ratio of the regional expenditures in the ﬁrst-best allocation.
We have seen that the ﬁxed regional share allocation have attractive properties when the
regional shares are well chosen. The intuition for this result is simple: when a region is in
power and can decide on the total expenditure on the public good G, even if the public good
is paid by all the regions, the ﬁxed share limits the regional beneﬁto fe x t e n d i n gt h et o t a l
expenditure on public goods. In other words, for every α euro spent in own region, there
10is automatically (1 − α) euro to be spent in other regions - the ﬁxed regional budget share
imposes a kind of federal budget constraint to the region making the decision.
4 Bargaining Stage
The ﬁxed regional share allocation works well if the shares are reasonable. What can we
say about the determination of the regional budget shares? The ﬁxed regional shares can
be seen as the outcome of legislative bargaining at federal level that takes the form of a
constitution. We demonstrate that the share of a region depends on its bargaining position.
More precisely, the stronger the bargaining position of the region, the bigger its share in the
federal budget.
To show this result, we employ a modiﬁed version of the legislative bargaining model
from Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In this model n ≥ 3 symmetric players decide how to
divide the budget of size 1 according to a particular voting rule. We consider two cases.
The ﬁrst case is the simple majority rule: it is necessary to have q out of n votes to pass
a proposal, where q ∈ (n/2,n). The second case is the unanimity rule: q = n and n ≥ 2.
Unanimity may be a requirement if we want to ﬁx the shares for a longer term such as in a
constitution.
The players are risk-neutral and only concerned about their own share. Each player i has




pi =1 . This player proposes a vector x ∈ Rn
+,w i t h
n X
i=1
xi ≤ 1,w h e r exi
is player i’s share of the budget. As soon as the proposal is made, the others vote in favor or
against. If a majority (at least q−1) of the players support it, the game ends and the budget
is distributed according to the proposal, i.e. x is implemented. Otherwise a new proposer is
selected and the same procedure is repeated. The players discount the future payoﬀsb ya
factor δ ∈ [0,1].
Usually, in literature, the analysis is restricted to the stationary subgame perfect equilib-
ria (SSPE). The existence result is provided by Banks and Duggan (2000) in a very general
setting in which the space of outcomes can be any convex compact set and the utility func-
11tions are concave but otherwise unrestricted.
The main predictions of the model are the following: First, there is a property of imme-
diate agreement. Even without discounting, there is a pressure to reach agreement in the
ﬁrst period because of the risk of being excluded afterwards. Second, only minimal winning
coalitions form in equilibrium, since otherwise it would be a waste of resources for the agenda
setter. Third, the proposer receives a disproportionately high share, because he/she always
buys the cheapest minimal coalition and pays the minimum amount to its members simply
to secure the acceptance of the proposal.
There is another interesting feature of the equilibrium which will be useful in our analysis.
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show, through the use of examples, that there are possibly mul-
tiple equilibria. However, Eraslan (2002) and Eraslan and McLennan (2006), using a quite
general setup of the bargaining game, prove uniqueness of the expected payoﬀs generated by
all the game’s stationary equilibria.
In the two following sections 4.1 and 4.2 we look at two diﬀerent approaches to explain
regional shares by the political bargaining process.
4.1 Regional Shares as Expected Payoﬀs
In this section we consider the regional shares as ﬁxed in the constitution, and suppose that
they are calculated as ex ante expected payoﬀs obtained from the described bargaining game.
Because of the appealing uniqueness property it is valid to do so.
4.1.1 Sharing Rule under Unanimity Voting
In this subsection we assume that it is necessary to have the votes of all n ≥ 2 players to
pass a proposal. Let yi denote player i’s ex ante expected payoﬀ. T h e nw ec a nw r i t et h e
following system of equations:




δyj)+( 1− pi)δyi for all i =1 ..n. (13)
12Thus, the expected payoﬀ yi of player i equals the ﬁrst term of (13) if he/she is a proposer
and the second term of (13) if he/she is not a proposer. With probability pi,p l a y e ri is a
proposer, and he/she buys the other players by proposing them their discounted expected
payoﬀs, and he/she takes the remaining. Otherwise, with probability 1 − pi he/she receives





and therefore, after simpliﬁcations the equations (13) become
yi = pi for all i =1 ..n.
T h u s ,w eh a v ep r o v e dt h ef o l l o w i n g :
Proposition 1 In a unanimity voting system, the expected regional shares equal the proba-
bility of being a proposer for any discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).
We obtain that the expected share of player i is equal to his/her probability of being
selected as a proposer. If we think of pi as of player i’s proposal power, then we can say that
the expected share of the player is proportional to his/her proposal power. Notice that this
result is independent of the discount factor δ.
If the probability of being a proposer is proportional to the population size of the region,
such as in a proportional representation system, the resulting shares αi are also proportional
to the population size.
4.1.2 Sharing Rule under the Majority Voting
In this section we consider the following situation: each player has one vote and q votes are
necessary to approve the decision. We take n =2 l +1 ,l≥ 1 and q ≥ l +1 .F o r t h e r e s t
of the section we assume that the players have the same discount factor δ,w h i c hi sc l o s et o
1.A s b e f o r e ,yi denotes player i’s ex ante expected payoﬀ. Without loss of generality we
suppose that the players are enumerated in such a way that y1 ≤ ... ≤ yn.
13Proposition 2 (Zaporozhets (2006))In a majority voting system either
(i) pi < 1







is characterized by the fact that each player is indiﬀerent to propose an allocation to any
minimal winning coalition, which includes himself. Or






pl <p j for any i =1 ...k and any j = k +1 ...n, (14)
and the vector of SSPE payoﬀsi sg i v e nb y
yi = y =
Pk
l=1 pl
(k +1− q)+( q − 1)
Pk
l=1 pl
for any i =1 ,...,k and (15)
yj =
(k +1− q)pj
(k +1− q)+( q − 1)
Pk
l=1 pl
for any j = k +1 ,...,n.
Remark 1 1. Result (i) can be interpreted in the following way: if the distribution of the
proposal power is relatively close to the uniform distribution then we obtain the uniform
sharing rule.








for at least one j ∈ {k +1 ,...n}.
So, the intuition of the result (ii) is the following: when the distribution of the proposal power
is too diﬀerent from the uniform distribution, the sharing rule is not uniform anymore.
3. The following properties are satisﬁed in this case: It is easy to see that ∂yi/∂pi > 0
for any i =1 ...n. Next, ex ante expected payoﬀso fp l a y e r s1...k are smaller than 1/n;a n d
then expected payoﬀs of at least some of the other players should be larger than 1/n.
For case n =3Proposition 2 provides the following results. Suppose, there is a “strong”
player with the probability of being selected as a proposer larger than 1/2. Without loss of










In this case it is easy to show that y3 is larger than 1/3, and y1 and y2 are smaller than 1/3.
If there is no such a player, i.e. for all i =1 ,2,3 probabilities pi < 1/2, everybody receives
exactly 1/3.
4.2 Implementation of Regional Shares through Trigger Strategies
Up to now we have showed that the ﬁxed regional sharing rule can be explained in terms
of the expected payoﬀs from the legislative bargaining game. Now, we modify our setting
slightly. As before, an agenda setter is chosen following a speciﬁed probability distribution
and the legislators discount future payoﬀs according to the discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).W e
suppose the regions agree in advance that, each period, whoever is becoming an agenda setter
will propose proportional distribution of the ﬁxed federal budget, i. e. he/she proposes shares
(αi)i=1..n.
In this subsection we assume that, if at some stage, the chosen agenda setter decides to
deviate from the given distribution, the other regions will play a non-cooperative one-stage
equilibrium during the following periods. The agenda setter will therefore choose a coalition
composed of q−1 other regions, and the regions outside this winning coalition get no public
good at all, even though they will bear the cost of taxes. Next, the agenda-setter will spend
only as much as necessary to keep the members of the winning coalition barely as well oﬀ as
with the default policy (zero utility level). Lastly, the agenda setter will choose regions that
are “cheapest” to buy oﬀ, i.e. that value a unit of the public good more than the others.
We are going to investigate a simple case, in which the legislators have the same quasi-
linear utility u(gi) from the consumption of the local public good gi:
u(gi)=( 1− t)Li + H(gi),








i=1 Li and ci is the unit cost of public good provision, and, for simplicity, it is





The beneﬁtf u n c t i o nH(gi) is identical for all regions, and as before, we assume that
H(0) = 0,H
0
(gi) > 0 and H
00
(gi) < 0, i =1 ..n.
In a one-period bargaining game a speciﬁed agenda setter chooses coalition M of size
q − 1 and oﬀers each of the coalition member as much as is necessary to restore his/her
default utility, i.e.
u(gi)=Li for each i ∈ M.




g for any i ∈ M,
where g is the size of the federal funds to be distributed. It is easy to see that coalition M
will contain regions with the smallest Li.













The non-members do not get any public good at all, however they bear the costs:
u(gi)=( 1− t)Li = Li − g
Li
L
for any i/ ∈ M.
16We would like to identify the conditions under which the deviation is not sustainable.
If at some stage of the game, legislator i is chosen to be a proposer and he/she decides to



























The ﬁrst term is the maximum the legislator could get by deviating, and the second term
reﬂects the inﬁnite punishment stage: the legislator can receive the maximum only if he/she
is chosen as a proposer and, if not, he/she simply bears the cost.
Expected payoﬀ (17) should be compared with his/her expected payoﬀ under the as-












That is, we examine under which conditions the following inequality holds true:
1
1 − δ
H (αig) ≥ H (g − gm)+
δ
1 − δ
piH (g − gm).
Multiplying by (1 − δ) and rearranging the terms we get:
δ ≥
H (g − gm) − H (αig)
(1 − pi)H (g − gm)
. (19)
The deviation is not sustainable if and only if the right hand side of (19) is smaller than
1.
O n ec a nc h e c kt h a ti ti ss m a l l e rt h a n1 if











17Assuming that αi = pi we get that
1
pi
H (αig) ≥ H (g) >H(g − gm),
and therefore (20) is satisﬁed. Thus, we showed that under additional assumption αi = pi
there exists threshold ¯ δ<1 such that for δ ≥ ¯ δ the ﬁxed sharing rule can be implemented.
5 Numerical Illustration for Railway Investments in
Belgium
Belgium is a federal country that consists of three regions: Brussels (capital and centrally
located), Flanders and Walloon region. Historically a tradition developed that only railway
investment plans satisfying the rule “60% (for Flanders) and 40% (for Wallonia)” can be
accepted by the federal parliament. We calibrate a small numerical example to illustrate the
eﬀect of the ﬁxed sharing rule.
5.1 Calibration of the Model
Let us denote by f and w the Flanders and Walloon regions respectively. We assume that
the observed equilibrium is a ﬁxed share equilibrium with ﬁxed shares 60% for Flanders and
40% for Wallonia.
We use the following speciﬁcation:
Hi(gi)=2 λi
√
gi, i = f,w,
where λi is a calibration parameter for the beneﬁt function, and assume average cost per
unit of rail investment ci in each region i = f,w. The rail geography of Belgium is such that
many passengers go to Brussels but almost do not use the infrastructure in the other region.
Brussels is the capital region in the middle of the country with Walloon region situated to
the south and the Flanders region situated to the north. We can therefore neglect regional
18spillovers between Flanders and Wallonia. The rail investments in Brussels are considered
to beneﬁt the whole federation and are kept outside the allocation mechanism.
For the calibration of the model we need two assumptions. First, it is often claimed that
the construction cost is higher in the more hilly Wallonia than in Flanders. We normalize
the Walloon construction cost cw to one and assume that cf =0 .85. Second, we assume that
the density of the railway network2 is 1.54 times higher in Flanders than in Wallonia. We
use this observation to assume that the beneﬁt scale parameter λi is larger for Flanders:
λf =1 .54λw.
From “Nationaal Instituut voor de Statistiek” (NIS) 2001 we know that
Lf =5 ,952,552 and Lw =3 ,346,457.





f =5 3 2 .6 million euro. (21)
We know that the share of Flanders is α =0 .6. From (21) and the fact that cfgf = αG
and cwfgw =( 1−α)G we can easily calculate the total investment levels for the ﬁxed sharing
rule in each region:
g
SR
f =5 .326 × 10
8 ∗ 0.6/0.85 = 376 million euro and
g
SR
w =5 .326 × 10
8 ∗ 0.4=2 1 3million euro.

































2T h ed e n s i t yi st h en u m b e ro fp e o p l ep e rk i l o m e t e ro fr a i l .I nF l a n d e r st h ed e n s i t yi s5952552/1848.7=
3219.9 a n di nW a l l o n i ai ti s3346457/1605.3 = 2084.6.
195.2 Scenarios



















2 =1 4 4million euro.
Thus, in the ﬁrst-best allocation Wallonia gets 23% and 77% goes to Flanders.














So, the diﬀerence (α∗ − α) is 0.167.
One can notice that Lf/L =0 .64 which is close to α =0 .6.
The numerical results for alternative equilibria are presented in Table 1, where utility
levels are given in millions of euro. The federal utility (the ﬁrst column) is deﬁned as the
simple sum of the regional utilities.
Table 1: Numerical Example.
Allocations Utility Utility Utility Invest- Invest- Eﬃciency
(fed) (F) (W) ment (F) ment (W)
FB 553 459 95 100% 100% 100%
CP 157 46 111 200% 630% 28%
SR 542 381 161 80% 148% 98%
SR(f) 540 381 159 88% 163% 98%
SR(w) 538 375 163 66% 123% 97%
We see that the common pool (CP) equilibrium indeed performs very poorly, with an
eﬃciency of 29% of the ﬁrst-best (FB) equilibrium. The ﬁxed regional sharing rule (SR)
20with diﬀerent speciﬁcations produces relatively good results. SR represents the equilibrium
obtained when the federal government chooses the total level of public goods that maximizes
the sum of regional utilities but respects the regional shares (see (9)). This could be seen
as the outcome of a coalition government. Equilibria SR(f) and SR(w) correspond to the
case where the same regional shares are used but where the total supply of public goods
maximizes the welfare function of the regions f or w. The result is that the three ﬁxed
share equilibria (SR, SR(f) and SR(w)) all perform striking much better in eﬃciency terms
than the common pool equilibrium. The main explanation for this result is that, in the
ﬁxed sharing equilibrium, the proposer is limited in exploiting his/her agenda setting power:
whatever extra supply of public goods he/she wants his/her region implies that he/she will
have to also supply public goods to the other regions.
To check that our results are not directly follow from a particular choice of parameters
we provide a sensitivity test. We change the power in the utility function from 0.5 to 0.25
and 0.75, respectively. The performed calculations are presented in the following Table 2.
Table 2: Sensitivity Test.
power 0.25 power 0.75
Allocations Invest Invest Eﬃciency Invest Invest Eﬃciency
(F) (W) (F) (W)
FB 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
CP 158% 341% 87% 398% 3981% 24%
SR 92% 115% 99.9% 53% 325% 98%
SR(f) 92% 115% 99.9% 77% 471% 98%
SR(w) 92% 115% 99.9% 25% 153% 97%
As one can see for the steeper utility function, performance of the diﬀerent sharing
rules improves. We also tested that equal regional costs cf = cw do not change the main
conclusions.
216C o n c l u s i o n
We used a stylized model to investigate diﬀerent allocation of regional investments across
regions of a federal state and the welfare implications. The ﬁxed regional shares allocation
appears to be relatively eﬃcient if the regional shares are reasonable. The regional shares
can be shown to be a function of the relative proposal power of the regions.
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